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Abstract
Using a local randomized experiment that arises from a sharp discontinuity in Disability
Insurance (DI) policy in Norway, we provide transparent and credible identiﬁcation of how
ﬁnancial incentives induce DI recipients to return to work. We ﬁnd that many DI recipients
have considerable capacity to work that can be e ectively induced by providing ﬁnancial work
incentives. We further show that providing work incentives to DI recipients may both increase
their disposable income and reduce program costs. Our ﬁndings also suggest that targeted
policies may be the most e ective in encouraging DI recipients to return to work.
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JEL-codes: H53, H55, I18, J21Disability Insurance (DI) programs have long been criticized by economists for apparent work
disincentives. Some countries have recently modiﬁed their program such that DI recipients are
allowed to keep some of their beneﬁts if they return to work, and other countries are considering
similar return-to-work policies. For example, the United Kingdom recently introduced the Path-
ways–to–Work program. One component of the reform was an increase in the ﬁnancial incentives
meant to encourage DI recipients to return to work; they were allowed to keep approximately 50%
of their disability beneﬁts for up to 12 months. Another example is the proposed change in the U.S.
DI program, known as the “$1 for $2 o set”. Under this policy, a DI recipient’s beneﬁts would be
reduced by $1 for every $2 of the person’s earnings above the substantial gainful activity (SGA)
threshold.
Advocates of such return-to-work policies claim that they increase the employment rate among
DI recipients and even encourage some to exit the DI rolls entirely; thus, they argue, the welfare of
DI recipients can be enhanced, and the cost of DI programs can be reduced. A counterargument is
that allowing DI recipients the option to return to work and keep a fraction of their beneﬁts makes
the program more generous, both for potential applicants and for current recipients; in theory,
therefore, return-to-work policies could reduce labor supply, lead to fewer exits from DI by current
recipients, and encourage more applications for DI.1
The challenge in assessing these arguments is that the evidence base for return-to-work policies
for DI recipients is scarce. In 1999, President Clinton signed a federal law that required the Social
Security Administration to undertake a randomized controlled trial. The study was supposed to
determine the magnitude of the labor supply response that would likely occur if a policy change
was made that allowed DI recipients to keep some portion of their beneﬁts if they returned to
work. However, no such experiment was conducted, and there is little non-experimental evidence
1These arguments are presented in several of the bills that have been brought to the ﬂoor of the U.S. Congress,
outlining options for reforming the work incentives of the SSDI program, including the Work Incentive and Self
Su ciency Act of 1996, the Rehabilitation and Return to Work Opportunity Act of 1996, and the Transition to Work
Act of 1997 (see e.g. Stapleton et al., 2008; Livermore, Roche and Prenovitz, 2009; Autor, 2011).
1to guide policy makers.
This paper helps to close that gap by analyzing the consequences of providing ﬁnancial in-
centives to DI recipients to encourage them to return to work. In January 2005, the Norwegian
government introduced such a program: the beneﬁts of DI recipients would be reduced by approx-
imately $0.6 for every $1 in earnings that they accumulated above the SGA threshold. However,
only recipients who had been awarded DI before January 1 of 2004 were eligible for the return-
to-work program. Because the cut-o  date for eligibility was set retroactively, individuals were
unable to gain entry to the program by manipulating the award date. This sharp discontinuity in DI
policy therefore provides an attractive setting to analyze the impact of ﬁnancial incentives using a
regression discontinuity (RD) design that compares recipients awarded DI just before January 1 of
2004 (i.e., the treatment group) and just after that date (i.e., the control group).
The insights from our RD analysis may be summarized with three broad conclusions. First,
many DI recipients have a considerable capacity to work that can be e ectively induced by pro-
viding ﬁnancial work incentives. Three years after implementation, the return-to-work program
has increased the labor force participation of DI recipients aged 18-49 by 8.5 percentage points.
In comparison, 3.4 percent of the control group participated in the labor force, and the labor force
participation among rejected DI applicants of the same age was just above 30 percent. Second,
the return-to-work program produced a substantial increase in the earnings of DI recipients. These
gains in earnings were accompanied by a small increase in disposable income and a substantial
reduction in the cost of the program. The reduction in costs is attributable to a signiﬁcant decrease
in beneﬁts and a small increase in the taxes paid by DI recipients. Third, there is signiﬁcant hetero-
geneity in the responsiveness to ﬁnancial work incentives, indicating that targeted policies may be
most e ective in inducing DI recipients to return to work. Among DI recipients aged 50-61, who
are approaching the retirement age, there is no evidence of any impact of the program. Within the
group of DI recipients aged 18-49, the estimates vary substantially, with the strongest responses
to ﬁnancial incentives among males, individuals with high education levels or more labor market
2experience, and people in areas with low unemployment.
To assess the internal validity of our RD design, we perform a number of speciﬁcation checks,
allofwhichsupportourmainresults. Wealsotakeseveralstepstoshedlightonthegeneralizability
of our ﬁndings. We begin by describing similarities and di erences between the DI systems in the
U.S. and in Norway. Next, we use the approach proposed by Bound (1989) to assess the work
capacity and labor supply elasticity of DI recipients. Bound uses the labor force participation rate
for rejected DI applicants as an upper bound estimate of the labor force participation rate for DI
recipients if the DI program had not existed. When applying this approach to the Norwegian data,
we obtain upper bound estimates that are quite similar to the recent U.S. evidence. This indicates
that the work capacity and labor supply elasticity of DI recipients in the U.S. are comparable to
those in Norway, lending support to the external validity of our analysis of the return-to-work
program.
Because the cut-o  date for eligibility to the return-to-work program was set retroactively, we
are not able to estimate the level of induced entry that may occur when DI recipients are given the
option to return to work and keep a fraction of their beneﬁts. We do, however, make a calculation
forthesizeoftheinducedentrythatwouldhavetobegeneratedbythereturn-to-workpolicytolead
to an increase in program costs. Our calculation indicates that the elasticity of entry response to
the change in DI beneﬁts needs to be much higher than what is suggested by the existing literature
(see e.g. Gruber, 2000; Campolieti, 2004).
Our paper is primarily related to a fairly small literature on the consequences of providing
ﬁnancial incentives that encourage DI recipients to return to work. Hoynes and Mo tt (1999) con-
clude via numerical simulations that some of the proposed reforms intended to incentivize work
among DI recipients are unlikely to be successful. Benitez-Silva, Buchinsky and Rust (2010) use
a calibrated life-cycle model to forecast the e ects of the “$1 for $2 o set” policy. These authors
ﬁnd that depending on the stigma costs associated with DI, the policy may encourage work by DI
recipients but could also induce entry into the DI program. Another related strand of the litera-
3ture examines return-to-work reforms that do not (exclusively) involve changes in ﬁnancial work
incentives. The results are mixed. The medical reassessment of beneﬁciaries through continuity
disability reviews and trial work periods via the Ticket to Work program does not appear to have
encouraged many people to return to work in the U.S. (Autor and Duggan, 2006). However, sev-
eral other policies appear to be quite e ective in inducing return to work on the part of disability
beneﬁciaries.2
Our paper is also related to a growing literature on the causes and consequences of the growth
in DI rolls (for a review, see Autor and Duggan (2006)). Such growth poses signiﬁcant risks to
the ﬁnances of DI programs and Social Security systems more generally. It also raises troubling
questions regarding whether the programs are being misused by recipients. We show that many in-
dividuals who are deemed totally and permanently disabled by the Social Security Administration
indeed have considerable work capacity and that their labor supply is fairly elastic with respect to
changes in ﬁnancial work incentives.
Our ﬁndings complement the current evidence on the work capacity and labor supply elasticity
of DI recipients. Some of the evidence comes from studies that examine the variation in beneﬁt
generosity across regions and over time to estimate the relationship between disability beneﬁts
and labor force participation. For example, Gruber (2000) studies the policy change conducted in
Canada. He estimatesthe elasticity oflabor force non-participationwith respectto DI beneﬁtlevels
in the range of 0.28 and 0.36. Another example is Autor and Duggan (2003), who use di erential
time variation in average beneﬁts across regions to identify the impact of DI on the labor force
participation of low-skilled workers. The authors conclude that the DI system has provided many
low-skilled workers with a viable alternative to unemployment.3
Much of the remaining evidence comes from studies that use the labor supply of rejected dis-
2See e.g. Adam, Bozio and Emmerson (2011), Moore (2011), Borghans, Gielen and Luttmer (2012), and Cam-
polieti and Riddell (2012).
3There is also a considerable body of evidence of how local labor market conditions and wages a ect entry to DI
(see e.g. Bratberg, 1999, Black, Daniel and Sanders, 2002, Rege, Telle and Votruba, 2009, Bratsberg, Fevang and
Roed, 2010).
4ability applicants to estimate the labor supply of DI recipients if the DI program had not existed.
Bound (1989) ﬁnds that the labor force participation rate of DI recipients in the U.S. would have
been at most 30 percentage points higher had they not received disability beneﬁts. Recent studies
have extended this analysis, in part by analyzing di erent subgroups and di erent time periods
but also with quasi-experimental variation in the disability determination process to improve the
comparability of DI recipients and rejected DI applicants.4
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I reviews the key facts regarding the
DI program in Norway, compares the system with that of the U.S., and discusses the return-to-
work program and its expected impact. Section II describes the data and discusses the empirical
strategy, Section III presents the empirical results, and Section IV concludes.
I Background
A The Norwegian DI program
In Norway, DI beneﬁts are designed to provide partial earnings replacement to all workers under
the full retirement age who are unable to engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medi-
cally determinable physical or mental impairment that has lasted for at least a year. The program is
part of the broader Social Security System and is ﬁnanced by employer- and employee-paid taxes.5
Disability determination process
To apply for DI beneﬁts, an individual must submit an application to a Social Security Adminis-
tration (SSA) o ce. The disability examiners ﬁrst review the non-medical criteria. Only adults
4See Chen and van der Klaauw (2008), French and Song (2009), von Wachter, Song and Manchester (2011), and
Maestas, Mullen and Strand (2012).
5Throughout this paper, we focus on the system for individuals who are deemed totally and permanently disabled
by the Social Security Administration. This category includes the majority of DI recipients. We have chosen this focus
because the return-to-work program was not intended to target the partially or temporarily disabled.
5below the (mandatory) retirement age of 67 years are eligible for DI. If the applicant meets the non-
medical criteria, disability examiners and medical sta  assess medical evidence from one or more
of the applicant’s health care providers regarding the applicant’s ability to perform work-related
activities. If the applicant has an impairment that is undoubtedly disabling, a disability award is
made. In other cases, the next step is to consider the applicant’s overall ability to work, taking into
account his or her health status, age, education, and work experience as well as the transferability
of the applicant’s skills. If the disability examiner concludes that the applicant cannot be expected
to engage in any substantial gainful activity, a disability award is made.
The level and duration of DI beneﬁts
The level of DI beneﬁts received is determined using a formula for which the ﬁrst step is to cal-
culate the average indexed annual earnings (AIE). Past earnings are indexed to the present value
using an inﬂator that is equal to the average wage growth in the economy. The years with the lowest
earnings are excluded from these calculations. The proportion of income that is replaced decreases
as past earnings increase so that low-wage workers replace a larger fraction of their earnings as
compared to high-wage workers.6
Once a person is enrolled in the DI program, there are three main pathways out of the program.
First, theDIrecipientmayreachtheretirementage, atwhichpointheorshewillshifttotheold-age
pension program of Social Security. In 2003, 74 percent of those who left DI did so for this reason.
Second, the recipient may die. Death accounted for 19 percent of all program exits in 2003. Third,
the recipient may no longer meet the non-medical or medical criteria for receiving DI beneﬁts. For
example, an individual may return to work and earn more than the permitted maximum amount.
In 2003, eligibility-based exits accounted for only 7 percent of all exits from the program.
6Consider, for example, the population of individuals awarded DI in 2003. If we divide this population into three
equally sized groups according to their earnings in 2000-2002, the average replacement rate is 90 percent in the
bottom tertile, 55 percent in the middle tertile, and 50 percent in the top tertile. See Rege, Telle and Votruba (2009)
for a detailed description of the formula determining the DI beneﬁts.
6B The return-to-work program and its expected e ects
In January 2005, the Norwegian government introduced a program to encourage DI recipients to
return to work. However, only recipients who had been awarded DI before January 1 of 2004
were eligible for the return-to-work program (i.e. the treatment group). Recipients who had been
awarded DI after January 1 of 2004 had to abide by the current rules (i.e. the control group).
Below, we describe the work incentives in the two programs and use static labor supply theory to
make economic predictions.7
The programs
There is only one di erence between the current rules and the return-to-work program: the manner
inwhichbeneﬁtsarereducedifearningsexceedtheSGAthreshold. Inbothprograms, thereisa12-
month waiting period after DI is awarded. If the DI recipient is working during the waiting period,
he or she becomes ineligible for DI beneﬁts. After the waiting period, both programs have a trial
working period allowing the DI recipient to test his or her work capacity without impacting future
beneﬁtpayments. Speciﬁcally, apersonisallowedtohaveearningsabovetheSGAthresholdforup
to ﬁve consecutive years without risking reduced beneﬁts should that person’s earnings fall below
SGA after these ﬁve years. If a person has earnings above SGA for more than ﬁve consecutive
years, beneﬁts would no longer be provided in full should the person’s earnings fall below SGA in
the future.
Both programs specify beneﬁts as functions of earnings, and not hours. During the trial work-
ing period, the formulas for annual DI beneﬁts in the return-to-work program (BT) and the current
rules (BC) depend on annual earnings (W) and the maximum annual beneﬁt level (B0) in the fol-
lowing way:
7The description of the two programs is based on the Norwegian government’s white paper from 2007 on disability
insurance (NOU, 2007). Throughout this paper, all monetary ﬁgures are ﬁxed at 2010 level. For the ﬁgures expressed
in U.S. dollars (USD), we have used the following exchange rate: NOK/USD = 6.
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B0 if W   SGA
where SGA = $12,450 p.a.
B0    (W   SGA)     if SGA < W   E
where   = SGA
AIE B0,  = B0
AIE
0 if W > E
where E = 0.8   AIE
BT =
 
                                                     
                                                     
B0 if W   SGA
where SGA = $12,450 p.a.
B0    (W   SGA) if SGA < W   e
where   = B0
AIE
0 if W > e
where e = 0.8   (SGA + AIE)
Beneﬁts are provided in full if the person’s annual earnings are less than SGA threshold, which
is set at monthly earnings of about USD 1,050. If earnings exceed SGA, the two programs di er.
Current rules create a discontinuous fall   in beneﬁts at the ﬁrst dollar earned above SGA; after
this notch, there is a   reduction in beneﬁts for every dollar in earnings; beneﬁts are provided until
earnings exceed the maximum permitted amount E; this situation implies the absence of disability
and therefore signals the individual’s ineligibility for DI beneﬁts. The return-to-work program
eliminates the discontinuous fall in beneﬁts at the SGA threshold; it also increases the maximum
permitted amount to e.
In our analysis, the waiting period implies that members of both the treatment group and the
control group would become ineligible for DI if they were working in 2004. The return-to-work
program takes e ect on January 1, 2005. From that date onwards, members of the treatment group
are incentivized to work by allowing them to keep more of their beneﬁts if earnings exceed SGA,
as compared to members of the control group. Our empirical analysis compares the behavior of the
treatment group and the control group over the period 2005-2007. Due to the trial working period,
members in both groups could have annual earnings above SGA in these years without risking
reduced beneﬁts should their earnings fall below the SGA in the future (e.g. 2008 or 2009).
8The budget constraints
The top graph in Figure 1 illustrates the di erence in work incentives across the treatment and
the control group. This ﬁgure translates the beneﬁt formulas into stylized budget constraints in
the income-leisure space. We consider the wage and beneﬁt levels associated with a typical DI
recipient. To compute the beneﬁt levels, we use the average work history of recipients awarded
DI during the period between July 2003 and February 2004. We set the hourly wage equal to the
average hourly wage in a sample of workers who are not on DI but have observable characteristics
similar to those of the DI recipients.8 The line AH (slope equal to the hourly wage rate) applies in
theabsenceofanyDIprogram. Forthesakeofsimplicityandwithminimallossofgeneralityabout
the expected impacts of the return-to-work program, we disregard income taxation and dependent
beneﬁts.
Insert Figure 1 approximately here
The budget constraint under the current rules is represented by BCDEFH. Beneﬁts are provided
in full at budget segment BC. At 10 hours of work per week, the person’s earnings are above the
SGA threshold, and the marginal tax rate on another hour of work exceeds 600 percent, thus
creating a notch in the budget constraint (represented by the line CD). At the budget segment DE,
hours of work range from 10 to 32 per week, and the person’s beneﬁts are phased out at a rate
of approximately $0.6 for every $1 in earnings. At 32 hours of work per week, earnings exceed
the maximum permitted amount and the person becomes ineligible for DI beneﬁts. This creates a
second notch that is given by the line EF.
The budget constraint in the return-to-work program is BCefH. The program eliminates the
ﬁrst notch in the budget constraint under current rules and phases out beneﬁts at budget segmentCe
8To compute the hourly wages, we use information from the Wage Statistics Survey in 2005. On the basis of
this sample of workers (who are not on DI), we regress hourly wages on the covariates included in Table 1 (except
diagnoses) and a full set of indicators for municipality of residence. We allow for a ﬂexible functional form by
including a large set of dummies for di erent covariate values. Using the estimated wage equation, we predict hourly
wages for individuals on DI, and compute the average wage rate.
9at a rate of approximately $0.6 for every $1 in earnings. The program also increases the maximum
permitted amount so that the individual can work as much as 43 hours per week before he or she
becomes ineligible for DI beneﬁts. This shifts the second notch to the left; it is now given by the
line ef.
The expected impacts
What are the expected e ects of the transformation of the budget constraint from the current rules
to the return-to-work program? To answer this question, we consider a static labor supply model
where DI recipients choose hours of work at the given o ered wage and o ered wages are constant;
we assume that preferences are convex and that leisure and income are normal goods. The idea is
to compare the labor supply incentives for someone facing the current rules to the counterfactual
state in which the person is assigned to the return-to-work program. As in Figure 1, we consider
the wage and beneﬁt levels associated with a typical DI recipient.9
We ﬁrst focus on the case in which DI recipients can freely choose hours of work. Consider a
DI recipient who under current rules would locate at point C, working 10 hours and receiving the
maximum beneﬁts. Depending on the individual’s preferences, assignment to the return-to-work
program could lead to either of two outcomes. First, the individual might continue to work 10
hours and receive the maximum beneﬁt with no change in income. Second, he or she might enter
the labor market, moving from C to some point at the budget segment Ce; beneﬁts are gradually
phased out, while income rises. Consider next an individual who under current rules would locate
at points on the budget segment DE that give higher income than at pointC. Then we would expect
the increase in beneﬁts accompanying assignment to the return-to-work program to reduce hours
of work and increase total income.10 Now imagine that an individual’s preferences are such that
9The work incentives depend on the wage rate the DI recipients face. In particular, if the wage rate is lower
(higher) than the wage of the typical DI recipients, the notches in the budget constraints at C, E and e are associated
with more (fewer) hours of work. Independently of the wage rate, however, the static labor supply model predicts that
the return-to-work program will increase the population share with earnings above SGA.
10If the individual would locate at point E under current rules, then the positive substitution e ect at this notch could
10he or she would locate to the left of e if assigned to current rules. Consider ﬁrst points like G.
Such points are clearly dominated under assignment to the return-to-work program by point e: the
individual can increase income by reducing hours of work and claiming beneﬁts. Consider next
points such as H. If disutility of labor is su ciently high, reduced labor hours would compensate
for the income lost in moving from H to e under assignment to the return-to-work program.
We now shift attention to the case in which DI recipients make discrete choices between no
work, part-time work, and full time-work (e.g., due to ﬁxed costs associated with working). This
is motivated by the bottom graph in Figure 1, showing the hours of work distribution in 2005 for a
sample of workers who are not on DI. We can see that the vast majority of employees were working
either part-time (15 hours per week) or full-time (37.5 hours per week), indicating that institutional
constraints on hours of work choices may be important.
ConsiderﬁrstanindividualwhoundercurrentruleswouldlocateatpointB,workingzerohours
and receiving the maximum beneﬁt levels. If the individual can freely choose their working hours,
he or she would continue to work zero hours under assignment to the return-to-work program. If DI
recipientsmakediscretechoices, however, theindividualcouldbeinducedtoenterthelabormarket
and increase income, moving from B to part-time or full-time work. Now consider an individual
who would choose part-time work if assigned to the current rules. Depending on the individual’s
preferences, assignment to the return-to-work program would lead to either of two outcomes. First,
the individual may continue to work part-time, receiving higher beneﬁts and disposable income.
Second, if the disutility of labor is su ciently low, the shifting of the second notch may induce an
individual to work full-time, increasing disposable income as the gains in earnings exceed the loss
in beneﬁts. Finally, consider a DI recipient who under assignment to the current rules would work
full-time. If the disutility of labor is su ciently strong, the mechanical induced eligibility e ect
could be accompanied by a move to part-time work; otherwise, he or she will continue to work
dominate the negative income e ect, so that he or she increases hours of work under assignment to the return-to-work
program.
11full-time while receiving DI beneﬁts.
In sum, the expected impacts of the return-to-work program are heterogeneous and may be neg-
ative, zero or positive. The static labor supply model predicts that the return-to-work program will
increase the population share with earnings above SGA, independently of whether DI recipients
freely choose hours of work. There are, however, no unambiguous predictions about the estimated
mean impacts of the return-to-work program: the sign and magnitude depend on the size of the
di erent responses weighted by the relative number of DI recipients along the budget constraint
under current rules. As discussed in more detail below, there are few DI recipients who earn more
than SGA under the current rules. It is therefore likely that the return-to-work program will in-
crease average earnings and income, and that it will reduce average beneﬁts. We will nevertheless
complement the usual mean impact analysis with estimates of the probability that earnings fall in
di erent segments of the budget constraint.
C Comparison with the U.S. program
The DI programs in Norway and the U.S. are quite similar and feature only three important di er-
ences.11
The ﬁrst di erence is that the incidence of receipt of DI beneﬁts is lower in the U.S. than in
Norway. Figure 2 shows this distinction by displaying the evolution of DI in the two countries.
Whereas the rate of DI receipt in a given year is consistently higher in Norway than in the U.S.,12
the time trends are quite similar. From 1961 to 2005, the rate of receipt increased from 2.2 to 10.4
11Our discussion of the U.S. system draws primarily on Autor and Duggan (2006), and pertains only to the SSDI
program. More than 80 percent of non-elderly U.S. adults are insured against the risk of disabling physical or mental
illness by SSDI (Autor and Duggan, 2006).
12Unlike the Norwegian DI program, the U.S. SSDI program does not o er temporary disability beneﬁts. To
improve comparability, Figure 2 therefore excludes temporarily disabled individuals when computing the number of
DI recipients in Norway. The cross-country di erence in coverage by the DI program is unlikely to explain the entire
discrepancy in the incidence of DI: although virtually all non-elderly adults are covered in Norway, more than 80
percent of all non-elderly adults are covered in the U.S. It is unclear whether the remaining di erence is a function of
underlying di erences in screening stringency, the frequency with which people apply for disability beneﬁts, or the
health of the population. However, Milligan and Wise (2011) argue that di erences in health are unlikely to explain
much of the observed di erences in rates of DI receipt across developed countries.
12percent in Norway and from 0.8 to 4.2 percent in the U.S. In both countries, the expansion of the
DI rolls in recent decades appears to be driven by the liberalization of the screening process, which
led to a rapid increase in the share of DI recipients su ering from di cult-to-verify disorders such
as mental illness and musculoskeletal disease.13 Because these are early-onset disorders with low
age-speciﬁc mortality, DI recipients with such diagnoses tend to participate in the program for
relatively long periods. As a result, the DI exit rates have decreased in the last few decades. In
1985, the DI exit rate was approximately 12.1 percent in the U.S. and 10.4 percent in Norway. In
both countries, this rate has trended steadily downward since that time and reached approximately
7 percent in 2004. As shown in Figure 2, this decline has been driven both by a decrease in the
fraction of DI recipients who reach the full retirement age and by a decrease in the fraction of DI
recipients who die.
Insert Figure 2 approximately here
The second di erence between the two programs is that the U.S. SSDI program is less gener-
ous. Appendix Figure A.1 shows this di erence by presenting stylized budget constraints in the
income-leisure space for the two DI programs. To compute the budget constraint for the U.S. pro-
gram, we use the same work history and wages as in Figure 1. We see that the maximum beneﬁt
level received if one’s earnings are below the SGA threshold is lower in the U.S. than in Norway;
for the worker we consider, the replacement rate would be 31 percent in the U.S. program and
58 percent in the Norwegian program.14 Although the two programs have similar SGA thresholds
(USD 1,050 per month in Norway and USD 1,000 per month in the U.S.), the U.S. program takes
earnings above the SGA threshold to imply the absence of disability and therefore ineligibility for
13See Autor and Duggan (2006) for a discussion of this phenomenon. In the U.S., the 1984 congressional reforms
shifted the focus of screening from medical to functional criteria. In Norway, the medical eligibility criteria were
relaxed earlier and more gradually.
14Forthesakeofsimplicity, ourcalculationsforthereplacementratesdisregardincometaxation, dependentbeneﬁts,
and health insurance. In both countries, the DI programs provide dependent beneﬁts. In addition, DI recipients in the
U.S. receive health insurance coverage through the federal Medicare program, which increases the replacement rate
somewhat. In Norway, all citizens are eligible for health insurance through the Social Insurance System.
13DI; this increases the tax rate associated with the ﬁrst notch and eliminates the second notch, as
compared to the Norwegian program. Figure A.1 also compares the budget constraints associated
with the proposed “$1 for $2 o set” policy with the return-to-work program. It is clear that the
“$1 for $2 o set” policy allows DI recipients who return to work to retain slightly more of their
beneﬁts. We also see that the “$1 for $2 o set” policy does not specify a maximum permitted
amount, which created the second notch in the budget constraints in Norway.
The last di erence is that DI recipients in Norway tend to be somewhat older and to have
slightly higher earnings prior to disability award. Appendix Table A.1 shows this distinction by
reporting the key characteristics of DI recipients in the U.S. and in Norway. The di erences in
the population characteristics are, however, less pronounced than one might expect given the dif-
ferences in the generosity of the program. For instance, the majority of DI recipients su er from
di cult-to-verify disorders including mental illness and musculoskeletal disease in both the U.S.
(57.4 %) and Norway (61.4 %).
II Data and empirical strategy
A Data and sample selection
Our analysis employs several data sources that we can link through unique identiﬁers for each
individual. The data on DI come from social security registers that contain complete records for
all individuals who entered the DI program during the period 2001-2005. The data set contains
information on the month when DI was awarded (or denied), the individual’s medical diagnosis
and average indexed earnings, and the level of DI beneﬁts received. We link this data with ad-
ministrative registers provided by Statistics Norway, using a rich longitudinal database that covers
every resident from 1967 to 2007. For each year, it contains individual demographic information
(regarding sex, age, and number of children), socio-economic data (regarding years of education,
14earnings, cash transfers, taxes, and private vs. public sector employment), and geographical iden-
tiﬁers that indicate place of residence.
The outcomes that we consider are deﬁned as follows. The ﬁrst key outcome is labor force
participation. As in Maestas, Mullen and Strand (2012), labor force participation is an indicator
variable that is equal to one if annual earnings exceed the annual SGA threshold, set at approxi-
mately USD 12,500 per year. Unfortunately, we are unable to measure labor supply at the intensive
margin because we do not have data on working hours.15 The second key outcome is annual gross
earnings, which includes wages and income from self-employment. We also consider the e ect of
the program on disposable income, incorporating earnings and beneﬁts net of taxes. In addition,
we examine the impact of the program on DI beneﬁts received and taxes paid. The last outcome
that we consider is exit from the DI program, which occurs if an individual is classiﬁed by the
Social Security Administration as no longer eligible for DI.
Our empirical analysis considers individuals aged 18-61 at the time of the DI award. The
reason for the upper age restriction is that Norwegian workers can receive early retirement beneﬁts
beginning at age 62; the lower age restriction is because individuals under 18 are not eligible
for DI. Throughout the empirical analysis, we partition the sample into two groups according to
age. One reason is that the cost of working may be di erent for younger DI recipients, who more
often su er from di cult-to-verify disorders such as mental illness (Autor and Duggan, 2006; von
Wachter, Song and Manchester, 2011). Another reason is that younger DI recipients may gain
more from returning to the labor force because they have a longer horizon until retirement (Bound,
Burkhauser and Nichols, 2003; von Wachter, Song and Manchester, 2011). In our main analysis,
we will focus on individuals who were aged 18-49 when they were awarded DI. In subsection III.F,
we also report results for older DI recipients, those who were aged 50-61 when they were awarded
DI.
15Figure 1 uses the Wage Statistics Survey to represent the distribution of working hours for a sample of workers
who are not on DI. Unfortunately, the sample provided by the Wage Statistics Survey is too small for us to analyze the
impact of the return-to-work program on hours of work.
15To assess the impact of the return-to-work program, we make two notable sample restrictions.
First, we restrict the sample to individuals who were deemed totally and permanently disabled by
the SSA, because the return-to-work program was not targeted at partially or temporarily disabled
individuals. Second, we exclude individuals who (prior to DI award) resided in a county with a
wage-subsidy policy. Five (of nineteen) counties provided wage subsidies to ﬁrms that hired DI
recipients. The reason for this sample restriction is to avoid confounding the e ects of the return-
to-work program with the impact of the wage policy. This gives a total of 9,471 individuals aged
18-61 who were awarded DI in 2003 (2,896 individuals were between the ages of 18 and 49, while
6,575 individuals were age 50-61). In the baseline RD speciﬁcation, the estimation sample consists
of individuals who were awarded DI between November 2003 and February 2004 (897 individuals
aged 18-49 and 2131 individuals aged 50-61).
B RD design
In our sharp RD design, assignment to the return-to-work program is a deterministic function of
the assignment variable, the date of the DI award (X): only recipients who had been awarded
DI before January 1 of 2004 were eligible for the return-to-work program. The RD design uses
separate regressions on each side of this cut-o  date (c). The regression model for the treatment
group is applied to the left side of the cut-o  date (X < c)
(1) Y =  l + fl(c   X) +  l,
whereas the regression model for the control group is applied the right side of the cut-o  date
(X > c)
(2) Y =  r + fr(X   c) +  r,
16where fr and fl are unknown functional forms. The RD estimate of the return-to-work program
is then given by the di erence between the estimated regression intercepts on the two sides of the
cut-o  date
(3) ˆ  
RD = ˆ  l   ˆ  r.
To make inferences about the impact of the program, we pool the two regressions and follow Fuji,
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009) in calculating the standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity.
To implement the RD design, we need to specify fr and fl and decide on the window on each
side of the cut-o  date. Our ﬁrst speciﬁcation uses a local linear regression with triangular kernel
density and 2 months of bandwidth on each side of the cut-o  date. This choice of bandwidth cor-
responds to the optimal bandwidth we obtain when following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
Our second speciﬁcation uses a window of just one month on each side of the cut-o  date. Because
we have monthly data for DI awards, the RD model is then equivalent to a ﬁrst-di erence (FD)
model: the average outcome for recipients who were awarded DI in December 2003 is compared
with the average outcome for recipients who were awarded DI in January 2004.
C Graphical evidence
A virtue of the RD design is that it provides a transparent way of showing how the program impact
is identiﬁed. To this end, we begin with a graphical depiction of how the labor market outcomes,
the covariates, and the density of the assignment variable vary around the cut-o  date, before
turning to a more detailed regression-based analysis.
The top panel of Figure 3 shows the mean labor force participation and average earnings for
recipients who were awarded DI between July 2003 and June 2004; the bottom panel of Figure 3
shows the means for the same labor market outcomes for recipients who were awarded DI between
July 2002 and June 2003; and Figure 4 graphs the covariates for recipients who were awarded DI
17between July 2003 and June 2004. In each ﬁgure, we plot the unrestricted monthly means and the
estimated monthly means using local linear regression applied to each side of the cut-o  dates.
Whereas the regression lines better illustrate the trends in the data and the size of the jumps at the
cut-o , the unrestricted means indicate the underlying noise in the data. In each graph, the scale
of the y-axis is set equal to ±.5 standard deviation of the respective variable. By standardizing the
y-axes in this way, it becomes easier to compare the trends in the data and the sizes of the jumps at
the cut-o  dates across the graphs.
Figure 3 shows evidence of a discontinuity in each outcome around January 1 of 2004, suggest-
ing that the return-to-work program had substantial e ects on the labor supply of DI recipients. In
comparison, there is no sign of discontinuous changes in labor market outcomes around January 1
of 2003; this ﬁnding is reassuring because there were no changes in assignment to the return-to-
work program around this cut-o  date.
Insert Figure 3 and Figure 4 approximately here
Note that the gray shaded areas in Figures 3 and 4 mark the months in which DI recipients were
a ected by a potentially confounding policy change. To address this issue, we will restrict the con-
trol group to the non-shaded area throughout our empirical analysis: that is, the control group will
only include individuals who were awarded DI in January and February 2004. The policy change
of concern was the introduction of temporary DI beneﬁts in January 2004. However, individuals
who had submitted their DI applications before January 2004 were ineligible for temporary DI.
Because it generally takes between 3 and 8 months to process the application, recipients who were
awarded DI before March 2004 were not a ected by the introduction of temporary DI beneﬁts.16
And because the cut-o  date for eligibility to temporary DI was set retroactively, individuals were
unable to gain or avoid entry to temporary DI by manipulating the application date.17
16The guidelines of the SSA state that applicants should expect that it takes 3-8 months (and not more than 12
months) to process the initial application. For example, for individuals who applied for DI in December 2003, the
reported average processing time was 176 days.
17Our results are qualitatively the same and quantitatively similar if we extend the control group to include individ-
18As a consequence of the individuals being unable to manipulate the award date, any pre-
determined characteristic should have the same distribution just before and just after January 1
of 2004. Figure 4 supports this conjecture, showing that the sample mean of the (pre-determined)
covariates tend to be quite stable around the cut-o  date. One exception is the DI rate of the munic-
ipality of residence (prior to DI beneﬁt award), which ﬂuctuates somewhat over time and decreases
around the cut-o  date. However, the decrease in the local DI rate is statistically insigniﬁcant at
conventional levels; and based on the large number of covariates and pre-reform outcomes we
consider, the probability of observing changes around the cut-o  date by chance alone is quite
large. It is, however, reassuring that there is little if any correlation between the local DI rate and
the outcome variables.18 As a consequence, controlling for the local DI rate barely moves our
estimates.
Another implication of local randomization is that the aggregate distribution of the assignment
variable, the date of the DI award, should be continuous around the cut-o  date; an increase in the
densitywouldindicatesortingaroundthethreshold, callingintoquestiontheappropriatenessofour
RD design. In Appendix Figure A.2, we examine the density of the assignment variable and per-
form the statistical test proposed by McCrary (2008). The left graph plots the unrestricted monthly
frequency and the estimated monthly frequency from a local linear regression applied to each side
of the cut-o  date for eligibility to temporary DI, March 2004. This graph shows that the number
of recipients awarded DI changes little from September 2003 to February 2004. In particular, there
is no evidence of a discontinuous change in the frequency at January 2004, as manipulation of the
application date would imply: while 220 individuals were awarded DI in December 2003, 215 in-
dividuals were awarded DI in January 2004. As expected, the sample size declines after February
2004, as the introduction of temporary DI crowds out some of the use of permanent DI beneﬁts.
uals who were awarded permanent DI after February 2004. The same holds true if we include individuals who were
awarded temporary DI in the control group. The results are available upon request.
18For example, the correlation between the local DI rate and labor force participation in our sample is -0.0029 in
2005, -0.0105 in 2006, and 0.0022 in 2007.
19The right graph displays the estimates behind McCrary’s test. We begin by plotting the monthly
density, and then smooth the histogram using local linear regression, separately on each side of
the cut-o . The formal test is implemented as a Wald test of the null hypothesis that there is no
jump in the density in January 2004. We cannot reject this null hypothesis: for instance, with a
bandwidth of 2 months and a bin-size of 1 month, the estimated jump in the density is -0.00712
with a standard error of 0.151.
III Empirical results
A Labor force participation and earnings
The ﬁrst column of Table 1 reports results from the FD model, comparing the outcomes for the
recipients who were awarded DI in December 2003 (the treatment group) and January 2004 (the
control group). There are substantial di erences between the labor market outcomes in the two
groups. The estimated e ect of the return-to-work program on labor force participation steadily
increased from 2-3 percentage points in 2005 to more than 5 percentage points in 2007. This
pattern is consistent with standard search-theoretical models of the labor market in which it takes
time for workers to ﬁnd jobs and for ﬁrms to ﬁll vacancies. By comparison, only 2-3 percent of
the control group participated in the labor force, and labor force participation among the rejected
applicants was approximately 30 percent. We can also see that the program almost doubled the
participants’ average earnings.
Insert Table 1 approximately here
The third column of Table 1 reports the RD estimates with 2 months of bandwidth on each
side of the cut-o  date. The key di erence between the FD model and the RD model is their as-
sumptions regarding how the potential outcomes change with the assignment variable: that is, the
shape of the potential outcome curves. The FD speciﬁcation takes the average outcome for the
20control group as a counterfactual for the treatment group in the absence of the return-to-work pro-
gram; the potential outcome curves are assumed to be ﬂat. If the potential outcome curves instead
slope upward, as the graphical evidence indicates, the FD model will underestimate the e ect of
the return-to-work program because the average outcome for the control group will be too large to
serve as an appropriate counterfactual for the treatment group. In this type of “smoothly contami-
nated” randomized experiment, the RD speciﬁcation uses the observed trends in the outcomes on
each side of the cut-o  to construct an appropriate counterfactual. As is evident from column 3 of
Table 1, the RD estimates are somewhat larger than the FD estimates. Again, the estimated e ect
of the return-to-work program on labor force participation steadily increased: in 2005, the estimate
is approximately 3 percentage points, while in 2007, it approaches 9 percentage points. We can
also see that the RD model estimates the increase in earnings to be approximately 110 percent.
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 1 add a set of pre-determined covariates to the FD model and the RD
model, respectively. As a consequence of a local randomized experiment, assignment to treatment
near the cut-o  should be independent of pre-determined covariates. Thus it is reassuring to see
that our results are robust to the inclusion of the covariates. Throughout the paper, we allow for a
ﬂexible functional form by including a large set of dummies for di erent values of the covariates.
In the remainder of the paper, we use FD and RD models with covariates as our baseline speciﬁca-
tions: including covariates in the RD design reduces the residual variance and is thus a useful way
to gain precision, especially in the subsample analysis where the sample size is relatively small
(see e.g. Froelich, 2007).
B Robustness analysis
To increase the conﬁdence in the RD design, we show that our ﬁndings are robust to a number
of speﬁciation checks. We begin by estimating a di erence-in-di erences (DiD) speciﬁcation of
both the FD model and the RD model. The main motivation for this robustness check is that
seasonality in applications could generate (discontinuous) changes in the potential outcomes ac-
21cording to the month in which individuals were awarded DI. Although neither the award rate nor
the observable characteristics of recipients show signs of seasonality in applications in the window
surrounding the reform, we cannot rule out (discontinuous) changes in unobservables by month of
award. The DiD speciﬁcation exploits the fact that recipients who were awarded DI just before and
just after January 1 of 2003 were assigned to the return-to-work program: signiﬁcant di erences
in the post-assignment outcomes for the two groups would therefore be unrelated to the return-to-
work program and should instead capture changes in outcomes due to the month in which DI was
awarded.
A standard DiD estimate is obtained by estimating the di erence in outcomes between indi-
viduals awarded DI in December 2002 and January 2003, and subtract it from the FD estimate of
the return-to-work program. The DiD speciﬁcation of the RD model is implemented in a similar
way: we ﬁrst re-estimate equations (1) and (2) using data for recipients awarded DI in November-
December 2002 and January-February 2003, respectively; we then subtract the di erence between
the estimated regression intercepts on the two sides of the cut-o  date from the RD estimate of
the return-to-work model; and calculate the standard errors by bootstrap with 1,000 replications.
Appendix Table A.2 reports estimates from the DiD speciﬁcation of both the FD model and the
RD model. The results suggest that month of award e ects do not confound the conclusions drawn
about whether ﬁnancial incentives encourage DI recipients to return to work.
The DiD speciﬁcation identify the impact of the return-to-work program under the assumption
that month of award e ects do not vary across years. Appendix Table A.3 challenges this assump-
tion by pretending that the return-to-work program takes e ect on January 1 of 2003 (instead of
the true reform date, January 1 of 2004). The placebo test for the standard DiD model is performed
by estimating the di erence in outcomes between individuals awarded DI in December 2001 and
January 2002, and subtract it from the di erence in outcomes between individuals awarded DI in
December 2002 and January 2003. The placebo test for the DiD speciﬁcation of the RD model
is similar, except that it uses the sample of individuals who were awarded DI between November
222001 and February 2002 and between November 2002 and February 2003. Both placebo tests
exploit that everyone in the estimation samples were assigned to the return-to-work program: sig-
niﬁcant placebo tests are therefore a sign of month of award e ects that vary across years, rather
than true program impacts. It is therefore reassuring that the estimates from the placebo tests are
small and insigniﬁcant.
Next, Appendix Table A.4 reports results from the usual speciﬁcation checks of the RD model.
Columns 1 and 2 in Panel (a) extend the bandwidth on the left side of the cut-o  date by one
month: the RD estimates change little, but our precision increases because the sample size (in
the treatment group) increases. Column 3-6 in Panel (a) use a linear functional form of fr and fl.
It is reassuring that the parametric regression produces estimates that are similar to those of the
baseline RD speciﬁcation. Columns 1-6 in Panel (b) constrain fr and fl to be the same on both
sides of the cut-o  date. Constraining the slope is in some sense inconsistent with the spirit of the
RD design because the data from the right of the cuto  are used to estimate  l, which is deﬁned
as a limit when approaching from the left of the cuto , and vice versa. One possible justiﬁcation
for a common slope is that if the functional form is the same on both sides of the cuto , then more
e cient estimates of program impact are obtained by imposing that constraint. Indeed, our results
are quite similar when we impose a common linear, quadratic or cubic slope.
In our analysis, we excluded individuals who (prior to DI beneﬁt award) resided in a county
with a wage-subsidy policy. The reason for this sample restriction is to avoid confounding the
e ects of the return-to-work program with the impact of wage subsidies to ﬁrms. Five (of nineteen)
counties provided wage subsidies to ﬁrms that hired DI recipients. Subsidies were available if
either the ﬁrm or the DI recipient resided in a county with the wage subsidy policy. To explore
potential spillover e ects between the return-to-work program and the wage subsidies, we have
collected information about local labor market regions. The main criteria used for deﬁning the
local labor market regions are commuting patterns and travel times. There are 161 local labor
market regions in Norway. Within ﬁve of the regions, there are counties both with and without
23the wage subsidy policy. To check for potential spillovers, we re-estimate the FD and RD model
without DI recipients who reside in any of these ﬁve regions. The estimates are close to our
baseline results, suggesting that spillover e ects are unlikely to drive the estimated e ects of the
return-to-work program.
Lastly, we assess to what extent the baseline RD estimates are generalizable to DI recipients
with longer spells of DI at the time of the return-to-work program. As shown in Lee and Lemieux
(2010), in the presence of heterogeneous treatment e ects, the RD estimate can be interpreted as
a weighted average treatment e ect across all individuals in the estimation sample. By extending
the bandwidth, the RD estimate assigns weight to the e ects of the return-to-work program also
for individuals “away from the threshold”. Appendix Figure A.3 shows RD estimates where we
increase the sample size in the treatment group by expanding the bandwidth to the left of the
threshold. We run 25 RD regressions, where each estimate increases the bandwidth to the left of
the cut-o  date by one month. Whether we use a bandwidth of 2 months (November and December
2003) or 26 months (November 2001 - December 2003), we always ﬁnd sizeable RD estimates of
the return-to-work program. The estimates decline somewhat with the size of the bandwidth, but
remains substantial even with a window of 26 months; one explanation for this decline is that the
costs and beneﬁts of working may change with the length of time spent on DI, either because of
human capital depreciation or due to deteriorating health. From a policy perspective, these ﬁndings
complement each other: while the RD estimate with a narrow bandwidth may be more informative
about the expected e ects on recent or new entrants to DI, the RD estimates with wider bandwidths
speak to the e ects on recipients with longer spells of DI at the time of the reform.
C Implied elasticity of labor force non-participation
Table 1 demonstrated that many DI recipients have considerable capacity to work that can be
e ectively induced by providing ﬁnancial work incentives. To compare the labor supply responses
with the changes in ﬁnancial incentives, we calculate the aggregate elasticity of labor force non-
24participation to the participation tax rates (PTR).19
We deﬁne the aggregate elasticity of labor force non-participation as
(4)   =
 (1 LFP)/(1 LFPcontrol)
 PTR/PTRcontrol ,
where  (1   LFP) denotes the di erence in the labor force non-participation rate between the
treatment group and the control group, (1   LFPcontrol) is the non-participation rate of the control
group,  PTR denotes the di erence between the treatment and the control group in terms of PTR,
and PTRcontrol is the mean PTR of the control group. To compute  , we need to decide how to
measure PTR. We begin by setting the amount of disposable income if one is not working (I0)
equal to the mean disposable income among the individuals in the control group who earn less
than the SGA threshold and thus are classiﬁed as not working.20 This allows us to compute a
measure of PTR at a given earnings level
PTRk = 1  
Ik   I0
Wk
, Wk > SGA. (5)
where Ik denotes the disposable income with earnings Wk.21 Figure 5 displays the PTR ﬁgures by
earnings level. We see that the tax and beneﬁt systems create virtually no ﬁnancial reward for work
in the control group. The return-to-work program lowers the PTR considerably, especially when
an individual’s earnings are close to the SGA threshold.
Insert Figure 5 approximately here
19In situations in which there are notches (or kinks) in the budget constraints, the PTR is generally viewed as more
relevant to behavioral participation responses than the marginal tax rates (see e.g. Eissa, Kleven and Kreiner, 2006;
Keane, 2011). We focus on the elasticity of labor force non-participation because it is less sensitive to small changes in
the very low labor force participation rate of the control group, as compared to the labor force participation elasticity.
20The elasticities barely move if we instead set I0 equal to zero.
21The computation of the participation tax rate incorporates DI beneﬁts, dependent beneﬁts, and taxes. Both earn-
ings and DI beneﬁts are subject to taxation. Employers are liable for payroll tax on earnings (up to 14 percent), and
there is no payroll tax on beneﬁts. If the payroll tax is passed on to workers in the form of lower wages, then the





[E(PTRk | treatment)   E(PTRk | control)]pk (6)
where E(PTRk | treatment) is the average PTR under the return-to-work program rules with Wk in
earnings, E(PTRk | control) is the average PTR under the current rules with Wk in earnings, and
pk =
Pr(k   W < k + dk | control)
 
k>SGA Pr(k   W < k + dk | control)
where dk is set equal to half of the SGA amount (USD 6,250 per year). This means that  PTR is
the weighted sum of the di erences between the PTRs of the treatment and control groups, with
the weights given by the (conditional) density of the earnings of individuals in the control group
who work. Figure 5 displays the density of earnings (above the SGA threshold) in the control
group and the treatment group. We see that most of the density is quite close to the SGA threshold,
which suggests that the di erences in PTR in this area are weighted heavily in  PTR.
Insert Table 2 approximately here
Table 2 shows the elasticities implied by the estimated e ects on labor force participation. Con-
sistent with the impact on labor force participation, the implied elasticities are larger (in absolute
value) for the RD model than for the FD model. The results suggest an average elasticity of labor
force non-participation to PTR between 0.119 (FD model) and 0.186 (RD model) over the period
2005-2007. The elasticity estimates peak in 2007, at which time the RD model suggests that a 10
percent reduction in PTR decreases labor force non-participation by 3 percent.
D Distributional e ects
So far, we have focused on the mean impacts of the return-to-work program. Since basic labor
supply theory suggests that these mean impacts might average together negative and positive labor
26supply responses, we turn attention to the distributional e ects of the return-to-work program.22
A quantile treatment e ects analysis is not feasible since few control group members are work-
ing. Instead, we explore e ects across the earnings distribution by estimating the probability that
earnings fall in di erent segments of the budget constraint (see Figure 1 and the discussion in
subsection I.B).
Table 3 reports FD and RD estimates at di erent parts of the earnings distribution. We can
see that the return-to-work program had the largest impact on the population share with earnings
betweenCandE.Inparticular, morethan70percentofthee ectonlaborforceparticipationcanbe
attributed to changes in the probability that earnings fall in this segment. This ﬁnding is consistent
with the prediction that assignment to the return-to-work program increases the labor supply of DI
recipients who would have located at the budget segment BC under current rules. There is also
suggestive evidence of small increases in the population shares with earnings between E and e or
above e. Although not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels, these ﬁndings indicate that
moves toward full-time work among individuals who would have located at segments BC or DE
under current rules dominate any negative labor supply response among (the few) individuals who
under current rules would have located above E.
Insert Table 3 approximately here
The graphical evidence displayed in Figure 5 complements the regression results reported in
Table 3. This ﬁgure shows the density of earnings in the control group and the treatment group,
alongside the PTR under current rules and in the return-to-work program. The graphical evidence
suggeststhatthereturn-to-workprogramhadthelargestimpactonearningsneartheSGAthreshold
(i.e. the budget segment between C and E) where PTR decreased the most.
22Bitler, Gelbach and Hoynes (2006) show the usefulness of estimating distributional e ects in situations where
theory predicts systematic heterogeneity in the impact of welfare reforms.
27E Financial costs and beneﬁts
Advocates of return-to-work policies claim that the welfare of DI recipients would improve and
the cost of DI programs would decrease if DI recipients who returned to work were allowed to
keep a signiﬁcant fraction of their beneﬁts. To investigate these claims, we examine the impact of
the return-to-work program on disposable income, DI beneﬁts received, taxes paid, and program
costs. Table 4 shows the results. Our estimates suggest that the gains in earnings translated into a
signiﬁcant reduction in the cost of the program and a small and statistically insigniﬁcant increase
in disposable income. The estimated reduction in costs is in the range of 3.5 and 5 percent of the
costs associated with DI under current rules, and it reﬂects a signiﬁcant decrease in beneﬁts and a
small increase in taxes paid by DI recipients.
Insert Table 4 approximately here
Critics of return-to-work policies counter that allowing DI recipients the option to return to
work and keep a fraction of their beneﬁts makes the program more generous, both for potential
applicants and for current recipients; in theory, therefore, return-to-work policies could lead to
fewer exits from DI by current recipients and encourage more applications for DI. Note, however,
that there is little room for a reduction in the exit rate, as few DI recipients exited the DI program
under current rules. Indeed, we ﬁnd no evidence of any impact of the return-to-work program on
the rate of exit from DI during the period 2005-2008. The point estimates are small and positive
(0.01 in FD model and 0.03 in RD model), but too imprecisely estimated to draw ﬁrm conclusions.
Unfortunately, our study is not informative about the level of induced entry that might occur if
new DI recipients were made eligible for the return-to-work program. In Appendix B, however,
we make a calculation for the size of the induced entry that would have to be generated by the
return-to-work policy to lead to an increase in program costs. Our calculation suggests that the
elasticity of entry response to the change in DI beneﬁts needs to be much higher than what the
28existing literature suggests.23
F Heterogeneity
Table 2 demonstrated that many DI recipients are elastic to changes in ﬁnancial incentives. How-
ever, these ﬁndings should be interpreted with caution because they pertain only to DI recipients
who are between the ages of 18 and 49. We now investigate the impact of the return-to-work pro-
gram on older DI recipients. Furthermore, we examine the degree of heterogeneity of the responses
to the return-to-work program among younger DI recipients.
Appendix Table A.5 reports the regression results from the subsample analysis. As is evident
from columns 3 and 4 of panel (a), much would be missed if we averaged together the labor supply
responses of older and younger DI recipients. Among older DI recipients, there is no evidence of
an increase in labor force participation due to the return-to-work program. One possible expla-
nation for this is that the gains from returning to the labor force may be greater for younger DI
recipients.24 Another possible explanation is that the cost of working may be lower for younger
DI recipients, who more often tend to su er from di cult-to-verify disorders such as mental ill-
ness (Autor and Duggan, 2006; von Wachter, Song and Manchester, 2011). To shed some light on
these explanation, we divide the sample of younger DI recipients into two groups: individuals with
mental illness (40 percent) and those su ering from other disorders (60 percent).25 The estimates
reported in columns 5-8 of panel (b) lend support to the ﬁrst explanation, as the impact of the
23The baseline RD (FD) estimate implies a lower bound of 1.5 (1.1) on the elasticity of induced entry that would
lead the return-to-work policy to increase program costs if new DI recipients were made eligible. In comparison,
Gruber (2000) reports elasticity estimates in the range of 0.28-0.36, whereas Campolieti (2004) ﬁnds little, if any,
e ect on entry rates from an increase in beneﬁt levels. There is also a sizeable literature that has estimated elasticities
of entry response by modeling labor force participation or DI recipiency as a function of potential DI beneﬁt levels.
Using cross-sectional variation in DI beneﬁts, these studies tend to ﬁnd elasticities in the range of 0.1-0.2 (see Gruber
(2000) for a review of this evidence).
24Higher gains from working for younger DI recipients may either come from shorter length of time spent on DI and
thus less human capital depriciation or because they have more years to potentially work and earn retirement beneﬁts
(Bound, Burkhauser and Nichols, 2003; von Wachter, Song and Manchester, 2011).
25Among individuals with other disorders, the main diagnosis groups are musculoskeletal diseases (37 percent),
neurological disorders (17 percent) and circulatory system disorders (5 percent). Because of small sample sizes, it is
not feasible to explore heterogeneity in the e ects by these disorders.
29return-to-work program tends to be smaller among DI recipients su ering from mental illness.
We also explore several dimensions of heterogeneity within the group of younger DI recipients.
Columns 5-8 of panel (d) show that the return-to-work program had the largest impact on DI recip-
ients living in areas with low unemployment rates, suggesting an important link between demand
side factors and program incentives. This ﬁnding is consistent with existing evidence showing that
local labor market conditions have a signiﬁcant impact on welfare spells for most demographic
groups (see e.g. Hoynes, 2000). Previous research has also found signiﬁcant di erences in the
responsiveness of di erent groups of welfare recipients to changes in ﬁnancial incentives (see e.g.
Mo tt, 1992). In particular, supply-side factors such as education and labor market experience
tend to be important. In line with this evidence, the responses to the return-to-work program are
stronger for individuals with high education levels or more labor market experience (measured by
AIE or years of employment).26 We further examine gender di erences in the e ects of the return-
to-work program. Columns 1-4 of panel (b) demonstrate that males respond considerably stronger
to the ﬁnancial incentives than females. The relatively weak response to the return-to-work pro-
gram among women is worrisome given that the growth of disability receipt in recent decades has
been far more pronounced among women than men (Autor and Duggan, 2006).
Insert Table 5 approximately here
Lastly, Table 5 summarizes the heterogeneity in program e ects: For each subgroup, it displays
the average e ect on labor force participation ( LFP), the average change in participation tax rate
( PTR), and the average elasticity of labor force non-participation ( ), over the period 2005-2007.
Table 5 shows that the heterogeneity in program e ects is weakly related to di erences in PTR
across subgroups. Instead, we ﬁnd that some subgroups respond much stronger to similar changes
26Unfortunately, we do not have information on other work-related factors such as previous occupation and in-
dustry. Because of small sample sizes, we are unable to examine the e ects of supply-side factors in di erent local
labor markets. The di erential e ects by supply-side factors could, in theory, therefore reﬂect that individuals with
low education levels and little labor market experience may be more likely to live in areas with adverse labor mar-
kets. However, the correlations between the local unemployment rate and individuals’ labor market experience and
education are weak (-0.05 for AIE and -0.04 for years of schooling).
30in ﬁnancial incentives; for example, women and individuals with low educational levels experience
relatively large reductions in participation tax rates, but still increase their labor force participation
lessthanmalesandhighlyeducatedindividuals. TheresultsinTable5alsoillustratetheproblemof
using cross-sectional variation in participation tax rates across groups to estimate the labor supply
elasticity of DI recipients.
G Comparison of upper bound estimates
We conclude our empirical analysis with a comparison between the upper bound estimates of
the counterfactual labor force participation rates of DI recipients in Norway and the U.S. This
comparisonputsthemagnitudeoftheRDestimatesintoperspective, andshedslightontheexternal
validity of the evidence from Norway.
We employ the approach suggested by Bound (1989), who uses a sample of rejected DI appli-
cants as a control group for the DI recipients and considers their labor force participation rate as
an upper bound estimate of the counterfactual labor force participation rate of DI recipients. On
the basis of data collected in 1972 and 1978, Bound ﬁnds that the labor force participation rate
of DI recipients in the U.S. would have been at most 30 percentage points higher had they not re-
ceived disability beneﬁts. Recent studies have extended this analysis, in part by analyzing di erent
subgroups and di erent time periods but also with quasi-experimental variation in the disability
determination process to improve the comparability of DI recipients and rejected DI applicants.27
Although there is some heterogeneity in the U.S. evidence, the estimates are consistently higher
than the labor force participation rates for our treatment group. There are several possible expla-
nations. One is that rejected applicants are likely to be in better health; thus, their labor force
attachment constitutes an upper bound for the employment behavior of new recipients. Another
possible explanation is that the counterfactuals di er: in Bound’s approach, the counterfactual
27See Chen and van der Klaauw (2008), French and Song (2009), von Wachter, Song and Manchester (2011), and
Maestas, Mullen and Strand (2012).
31is a scenario in which the DI program does not exist, whereas in our case, the counterfactual is
a scenario in which DI recipients are faced with higher participation tax rates. A third possible
explanation is that DI recipients in the U.S. and Norway have substantially di erent work capac-
ity and labor supply elasticity. If the latter explanation was empirically important, it would raise
concerns about the external validity of our RD estimates.
To shed light on this issue of external validity, we apply the Bound approach to the Norwegian
data. Appendix Table A.6 displays the mean di erences between the rejected applicants and those
who were awarded DI in terms of observable characteristics and labor force participation. The
sample contains three groups: individuals whose DI applications were rejected in December 2003
or January 2004, individuals who were awarded DI in December of 2003 (treatment group), and
individuals who were awarded DI in January 2004 (control group). When we compare the rejected
applicants with the control (treatment) group, the counterfactual is the scenario in which DI under
the current rules (the return-to-work program rules) does not exist. A concern with the Bound
approach is that the employment rate of rejected applicants might in part reﬂect the fact that some
oftheseindividualswerestillintheprocessofappealingthedenial(seee.g. Bound,1991;Parsons,
1991). Following von Wachter, Song and Manchester (2011), we address this issue by excluding
rejected applicants who were subsequently awarded DI beneﬁts over the next ﬁve years.28
Appendix Table A.6 shows that the labor force participation rate is 22-26 (24-30) percent-
age points higher among rejected applicants than among treatment group (control group). In the
Bound approach, these di erences are interpreted as upper bound estimates of the counterfactual
labor force participation rate among DI recipients. However, there are some signiﬁcant di erences
in the observable characteristics of the rejected and awarded DI applicants. When we control for
the di erences in their observable characteristics, the upper bound estimates increase by 2-4 per-
28When comparing the Norwegian upper bound estimates to the U.S. evidence, it is therefore reassuring to ﬁnd that
appeals play a similar role in the two countries. In the U.S., 60 percent of the initially rejected applicants appeal; of
these, 70 percent were subsequently awarded DI beneﬁts over the next ﬁve years (Autor et al., 2011). In Norway, 57
percent of the initially rejected applicants appealed (or quickly re-applied); of these, 77 percent were subsequently
awarded DI beneﬁts over the next ﬁve years.
32centage points. These estimates are quite similar to the recent US evidence, and very close to the
results for DI recipients of comparable ages reported in von Wachter, Song and Manchester (2011).
The similarity between the upper bound estimates indicates that the work capacity and labor
supply elasticity of DI recipients in Norway are comparable to those of DI recipients in the U.S.,
which lends support to the external validity of our analysis of the return-to-work program. This
suggests that our ﬁndings may have important implications for the proposed “$1 for $2 o set”
policy in the U.S. As shown in Appendix Figure A.1, the U.S. policy proposal strengthens the in-
centives for labor force participation more than the return-to-work program. Our ﬁndings therefore
suggest that the “$1 for $2 o set” policy may be quite e ective in inducing DI recipients in the
U.S. to return to work.
IV Conclusion
Autor and Duggan (2006) argue that the liberalization of the screening process and the movement
away from physically exertive work have blurred the divide between the totally and permanently
disabled and those who are disabled but retain some work capacity. In this paper, we have inves-
tigated whether many individuals who are deemed totally and permanently disabled by the Social
Security Administration indeed have considerable work capacity and examined how elastic their
labor supply is to changes in ﬁnancial incentives.
Using a local randomized experiment that arises from a sharp discontinuity in DI policy in
Norway, we provide transparent and credible identiﬁcation of how ﬁnancial incentives induce DI
recipients to return to work. We ﬁnd that many DI recipients have considerable capacity to work
that can be e ectively induced by providing ﬁnancial work incentives. We also show that encour-
aging DI recipients to work not only increases their disposable income but also reduces program
costs.
However, these ﬁndings should be interpreted with caution: they apply only to DI recipients
33between the ages of 18 and 49. Among older DI recipients, we ﬁnd no response to ﬁnancial
work incentives. However, because the age of entry into DI has decreased in most developed
countries during the last few decades, the elastic labor supply of younger DI recipients may be
quite important from a policy perspective. In particular, our ﬁndings indicate that policies that
target younger DI recipients may be most e ective in encouraging DI recipients to return to work.
Another caveat is that our study is not informative about the level of induced entry that might
occur if DI recipients are given the option to return to work and keep a fraction of their beneﬁts.
This is because the cut-o  date for eligibility to the return-to-work program was retroactive. We
do, however, make a calculation for the size of the induced entry that would have to be generated
by the return-to-work policy to lead to an increase in program costs. Our calculation indicates that
the elasticity of entry response to the change in DI beneﬁts needs to be much higher than what the
existing literature suggests.
Lastly, we advise readers to exercise the usual caution in importing our ﬁndings to other coun-
tries. Nevertheless, as shown above, the DI programs in Norway and the U.S. are similar in many
respects. Furthermore, when we apply the Bound (1989) approach to the Norwegian data, we ﬁnd
upper bound estimates of the counterfactual labor force participation rate of DI recipients that are
fairly consistent with recent U.S. evidence. This ﬁnding indicates that the work capacity and labor
supply elasticity of DI recipients in Norway are comparable to those of DI recipients in the U.S.,
which lends some support to the external validity of our analysis of the return-to-work program.
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38Table 1: Program impact on labor force participation and earnings
Outcome variables: FD FD w/c RD RD w/c Comparison means [st. dev]
Jan. & Feb. 04 Rejected applicants
LFP(2005) 0.022 0.033** 0.028 0.038 0.018 0.26
(0.015) (0.016) (0.024) (0.025) [0.134] [0.440]
LFP(2006) 0.031* 0.033* 0.039 0.042* 0.02 0.316
(0.017) (0.018) (0.027) (0.026) [0.142] [0.466]
LFP(2007) 0.054*** 0.053** 0.087*** 0.085*** 0.034 0.316
(0.02) (0.022) (0.031) (0.031) [0.182] [0.466]
Avg. earnings 1126** 1247** 1630** 1644** 1551 13223
(2005-2007) (508) (535) (799) (781) [5033] [21314]
Characteristics: FD RD Comparison means
Jan. & Feb. 04 Rejected applicants
Age at DI award -0.30 -0.20 38.4 38.6
(0.91) (1.44) [9.7] [7.5]
Male -0.052 -0.076 0.50 0.515
(0.048) (0.075) [0.50] [0.50]
Years of Schooling 0.32 0.29 10.5 9.9
(0.28) (0.44) [3.1] [3.8]
Experience -0.21 -0.43 13.9 11.3
(0.92) (1.45) [10.0] [9.0]
AIE -290 -1123 38013 34558
(1565) (2486) [17686] [15118]
Local unemployment rate -0.001 -0.002 0.024 0.024
(0.001) (0.001) [0.008] [0.009]
Local DI rate 0.004 0.005 0.098 0.098
(0.003) (0.004) [0.024] [0.024]
Number of Children -0.031 -0.08 0.90 0.954
(0.11) (0.17) [1.13] [1.23]
Musculoskeletal system 0.013 0.026 0.22 0.332
(0.040) (0.062) [0.415] [0.472]
Mental disorders 0.041 0.041 0.386 0.321
(0.048) (0.075) [0.487] [0.468]
Obs 435 897 440 196
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level, ** signiﬁcant at 5% level, *signiﬁcant at 10% level.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroscedasticity.
Note: This table displays the main results. The ﬁrst two columns display estimates from the ﬁrst di erence model without covariates (FD) and with covariates (FD w/c); the sample consists of
individuals aged 18-49 (at the date of DI award), who were awarded DI in Dec. 2003 & Jan. 2004. The third and fourth columns display estimates from the regression discontinuity model without
covariates (RD) and with covariates (RD w/c); we use a local linear regression with a triangular kernel density function and 2 months of bandwidth on each side of the cut-o  date; the sample
consists of individuals aged 18-49 (at the date of DI award), who were awarded DI in Nov. 2003 - Feb. 2004. Labor force participation (LFP) is equal to one if annual earnings exceed SGA.
Average earnings are the mean annual earnings in USD over the period 2005-2007 (NOK/USD  6). All individual characteristics are measured prior to disability award. Experience is the number
of years with earnings above SGA. The AIE summarizes the earning history. The local unemployment rate is the fraction of the adult population (aged 18-66) receiving unemployment beneﬁts in
the municipality of residence. The local DI rate is the fraction of the eligible population receiving DI beneﬁts in the municipality of residence. Number of children is the total number of children
under 18. We also report the proportion of DI recipients with the two main diagnosis groups: musculoskeletal diseases and mental disorders. We allow for a ﬂexible functional form by including a
large set of dummies for di erent values of the covariates. The ﬁfth column shows mean and standard deviation (in square brackets) of the outcomes and characteristics for individuals aged 18-49
(at the date of DI award), who were awarded DI in Jan. & Feb. 2004. The last column shows mean and standard deviation (in square brackets) of the outcomes and characteristics for individuals
aged 18-49 (at the date of DI rejection), whose DI application was rejected in Dec. 2003 & Jan. 2004 (excluding those who successfully re-apply/appeal during the next ﬁve years).Table 2: Implied elasticity of labor-force non-participation
FD model RD model
2005 2006 2007 Average 2005 2006 2007 Average
 (1   LFP) -0.033 -0.033 -0.053 -0.040 -0.038 -0.042 -0.085 -0.055
(1   LFPcontrol) 0.986 0.981 0.981 0.983 0.981 0.979 0.966 0.976
 PTR -0.251 -0.294 -0.332 -0.292 -0.244 -0.285 -0.250 -0.260
PTRcontrol 0.847 0.857 0.865 0.855 0.849 0.857 0.863 0.856
Elasticity( ) 0.114 0.099 0.141 0.119 0.135 0.130 0.300 0.186
Note: This table displays aggregate non-participation elasticities for the sample of individuals aged 18-49 at the date of DI award. The elasticity formula is given in equation (4). The di erences
in labor force non-participation between the treatment and the control group ( (1   LFP)) are from the FD and RD model with covariates (see the second and fourth columns of Table 1). The
participation tax rate (PTR) is given by equation (5), and incorporates the DI system, income taxation, and dependent beneﬁts. The di erences in PTR between the treatment and control group
( PTR) are given by equation (6). (1   LFPcontrol) denotes the non-participation rate of the control group, while PTRcontrol is the mean PTR of the control group.Table 3: Distributional effects
FD model
Earnings > CC < Earnings   EE < Earnings   e Earnings > e
Earnings(2005) 0.033** 0.026 0.011 0
(0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.000)
Earnings(2006) 0.033* 0.025 0.007 0.009
(0.018) (0.017) (0.005) (0.009)
Earnings(2007) 0.053*** 0.038** 0.012* 0.015
(0.022) (0.019) (0.007) (0.011)
Avg. earnings 0.062*** 0.053*** 0.016 0.006
(2005-2007) (0.019) (0.018) (0.011) (0.006)
Obs 435 435 435 435
RD model
Earnings > CC < Earnings   EE < Earnings   e Earnings > e
Earnings(2005) 0.038 0.028 0.009 0.01
(0.025) (0.024) (0.018) (0.008)
Earnings(2006) 0.042* 0.031 0.01 0.011
(0.026) (0.023) (0.008) (0.011)
Earnings(2007) 0.085*** 0.062** 0.019* 0.022
(0.031) (0.027) (0.010) (0.016)
Avg. earnings 0.089*** 0.074*** 0.024* 0.01
(2005-2007) (0.028) (0.025) (0.014) (0.009)
Obs 897 897 897 897
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level, ** signiﬁcant at 5% level, *signiﬁcant at 10% level.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroscedasticity.
Note: This table displays the estimated impact of the return-to-work program on the probability that earnings fall in di erent segments of the budget constraint (see ﬁgure 1) over the period
2005-2007. The sample consists of individuals aged 18-49 at the date of DI award. The estimates are from the FD and RD model with covariates (see Table 1).Table 4: Financial costs and benefits
Estimates Comparison means [st. dev]
Outcome variables: FD-model RD-model Jan. & Feb 04 Rejected Applicants
Avg. Earnings 1247** 1644** 1551 13223
(2005-2007) (535) (782) [5032] [21314]
Avg. Beneﬁts -798** -1155** 33770 N/A
(2005-2007) (359) (536) [8080]
Avg. Tax 201 263 5234 4915
(2005-2007) (156) (229) [2790] [5807]
Avg. Disposable Income 248 226 30087 24402
(2005-2007) (279) (422) [6217] [19606]
Avg. Program Cost -1000** -1418** 28535 N/A
(396) (580) [6169]
Obs 435 897 440 196
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level, ** signiﬁcant at 5% level, *signiﬁcant at 10% level.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroscedasticity.
Note: This table displays the estimated impact of the return-to-work program on average earnings, beneﬁts, taxes, disposable income and program costs (in USD) over the period 2005-2007
(NOK/USD  6). The sample consists of individuals aged 18-49 at the date of DI award. The estimates are from the FD and RD model with covariates (see Table 1). Taxes include tax on earnings
and beneﬁts. Program cost equals beneﬁts minus taxes. Disposable income equals earnings plus beneﬁts less taxes. The third column shows mean and standard deviation (in square brackets) of the
outcomes for individuals aged 18-49 (at the date of DI award), who were awarded DI in Jan. & Feb. 2004. The last column shows mean and standard deviation (in square brackets) of the outcomes
for individuals aged 18-49 (at the date of DI rejection), whose DI application was rejected in Dec. 2003 and Jan. 2004 (excluding those who successfully re-apply/appeal during the following ﬁve
years).Table 5: Heterogeneity in program effects
FD model RD model
Subgroups:  LFP  PTR Elasticity( )  LFP  PTR Elasticity( )
Females 0.017 -0.321 0.046 0.026 -0.291 0.080
Males 0.060 -0.270 0.193 0.079 -0.257 0.268
Low education 0.037 -0.297 0.110 0.041 -0.28 0.131
High education 0.061 -0.279 0.188 0.085 -0.256 0.291
Low unempl. rate 0.067 -0.285 0.204 0.111 -0.249 0.392
High unempl. rate 0.010 -0.301 0.030 0.008 -0.291 0.024
Low experience -0.001 -0.264 0.002 0.010 -0.279 0.031
High experience 0.061 -0.317 0.170 0.079 -0.265 0.269
Low AIE 0.016 -0.287 0.049 0.028 -0.219 0.11
High AIE 0.067 -0.298 0.194 0.093 -0.281 0.293
Mental disorders 0.033 -0.313 0.091 0.039 -0.296 0.111
Other disorders 0.054 -0.265 0.176 0.067 -0.255 0.234
Note: This table summarizes the subsample estimates reported in Appendix Table A.5. The sample consists of individuals aged 18-49 at the date of DI award. Columns 1 and 3 report the
average e ect on labor force participation ( LFP), columns 2 and 4 report the average change in participation tax rate ( PTR), and columns 3 and 6 report the average elasticity of labor force
non-participation ( ), over the period 2005-2007. The elasticity formula is given in equation (4). Columns 1-3 use the baseline FD model, while columns 4-6 use the baseline RD model. The
elasiticity and its components are computed separately for each subgroup (see Table 2 for a description of how the elasticity is computed). Low (high) experience is deﬁned as years of experience
below (above) the sample median. Low (high) AIE is deﬁned as average indexed earnings below (above) the sample median. Low (high) unemployment rate is deﬁned as living in a municipality in
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(b) Hours of work distribution of employees (not on DI)
Note: Graph (a): The black solid lines represent the budget set for individuals under current rules and the dashed lines represent the change in the
budget constraint due to the return-to-work program. We use the wage and beneﬁt levels associated with a typical DI recipient. To compute the
beneﬁt levels, we use the average work history of recipients awarded DI during the period July 2003 - Feb. 2004. We further set the hourly wage
equal to the average hourly wage in a sample of workers who are not on DI but have similar observable characteristics as the DI recipients (see
footnote 8). For simplicity, we disregard income taxation and dependent beneﬁts: Total weekly income is thus equal to earnings plus DI beneﬁts.
Graph (b): Displays the hours of work distribution of employees who are not receiving DI beneﬁts. We use information from the Wage Statistics
Survey in 2005. This survey covers all employees in the public sector. For employees in the private sector, the data is based on an annual stratiﬁed
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(c) Exit rates by reason
Note: The U.S. SSDI trends are based on Autor and Duggan (2006), while the Norwegian trends are collected from various issues of the Social
Security Annual Statistical Supplement. Unlike the Norwegian DI program, the U.S. SSDI program does not o er temporary disability beneﬁts. To
improve comparability, Figure 2 therefore excludes temporarily disabled individuals when computing the number of DI recipients in Norway. Panel
(a): Incidence of DI recipiency, deﬁned as the percent receiving DI beneﬁts in the adult population (aged 18 - 67 years in Norway; aged 25-64 years
in the US). Panel (b): Award rate in the adult population (left axis), and exit rate from the population of DI recipients (right axis). Panel (c): Exit
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Note: This ﬁgure displays the the density of annual earnings (right axis) and the participation tax rate (left axis) for earnings above SGA, under
current rules (control group) and in the return-to-work program (treatment group). The x-axis represents annual earnings in USD (NOK/USD  6).
The sample consists of individuals aged 18-49 (at the date of DI award), who were awarded DI beneﬁts in Dec. 2003 & Jan. 2004. The vertical lines
mark the maximum permitted annual earnings under current rules (E) and under the return-to-work program (e) (see Figure 1). The participation tax
rate (PTR) is given by equation (5), and incorporates the DI system, income taxation, and dependent beneﬁts. The earnings densities are calculated
with a bin size of 0.5 SGA. The dots represent the unrestricted density in each bin, while the lines represent the estimated densities from local linear
regressions.